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Bramble Bush Revisited: Llewellyn,
The Great Depression and the First
Law School Crisis, 1929-1939
Anders Walker

I. Introduction
Nihil sub sole novum. Early in the fall semester of 1929, Columbia Law
Professor Karl Llewellyn delivered a series of bn lectures “to introduce the
students at Columbia Law School to the study of law,” including the “case
method.”2 Adopting a lively, spirited tone, Llewellyn likened the case method
to the fabled bramble bush, a barbed plant into which “a man … wondrous
wise” jumped, only to scratch out his eyes and, after some amount of suffering,
return to scratch “them in again.”3 Rigorous but rewarding, legal education
was well worth it. “[A]s the tonic iodine burns in the wounds and beneath
the skin,” rhapsodized Llewellyn, “the [student’s] whole body tingles with
that curious bubbling sense of muscle pleasure,” a sense that “for too much
law, more law will be the cure.”4 Five years later, in the winter of 1935, the
43-year-old law professor strummed a darker chord. American law schools
were a sham, Llewellyn declared to an audience at Harvard in the midst of
the nation’s worst economic crisis in history.5 Rather than train students for
the job market, law schools took their students’ “coin” and, in return, offered
little more than a “pretense of training for the law.”6 While legal education had
1

Anders Walker is a Professor at Saint Louis University School of Law, Yale University Ph.D.
2003, Duke University J.D. 1998, Wesleyan University B.A. 1994. I would like to thank Kenneth
W. Mack, Brian Leiter, Brian Tamanaha, Mark Graber, A. Benjamin Spencer, William LaPiana,
James Moliterno, Laura Appleman, and Colin Picker for comments and suggestions. I would also
like to thank Saint Louis University School of Law for sponsoring an early draft of this piece as
the Vincent C. Immel inaugural lecture on law teaching, and the archivists at the Columbia Center
for Oral History Archive for procuring unpublished interview transcripts of Herbert Wechsler.

1.

“There is nothing new under the sun.” Ecclesiastes 1:9.

2.

Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush vii (1930).

3.

Id. at iv.

4.

Id. at 122.

5.

Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 651 (1935).

6.

Id. at 657.

Journal of Legal Education, Volume 64, Number 2 (November 2014)

146

Journal of Legal Education

invigorated him only five years before, now it sickened him; law schools were
mere “conveyor belts,” industrial facilities aimed at “mass-production.”7
Then—suddenly—happy days returned. By 1956, amid an economic boom
that lasted more than a decade, Llewellyn cast himself joyously back into
the bramble bush, extolling legal education and legal scholarship. “Look
about you,” Llewellyn implored a group of law professors at a conference in
Michigan, “[o]ne of you three, before this current academic year is out, will
not only be doing legal research—every man of law has been doing that all his
life—one of you three will be doing or contributing to a bit of significant legal
research.”8 This, argued Llewellyn, was “a new something in this America,”
particularly since he could “remember when legal research other than into
doctrine—except perhaps in the fields of history, crime and divorce—seemed,
if not disreputable, at best queer.”9 Now, argued Llewellyn, the field was ripe
for interdisciplinary work, conducted by the “double or treble discipline law
teacher,” capable of “cut[ting] moats across the path of the social scientist
who seeks to work in that disregarded, even almost disreputable, discipline,
the law.”10
Law’s long struggle to gain academic respectability remains one of the most
overlooked aspects of the history of legal education, even though it helps
explain the prominence of theoretical research in law schools today.11 During
the 1920s, for example, law professors at elite schools promoted theoretical
scholarship in a deliberate bid to improve the intellectual integrity of legal
education generally. This continued during the Great Depression, even as
many blamed law schools for poorly preparing students, a move that—like
today—yielded calls for reform.12 However, proposals for reform in the 1930s
differed from current suggestions in that they argued not simply for more
apprenticeship-style programs—a popular current corrective—but also for
more inter-disciplinary offerings, what Llewellyn termed an “integration of the
human and the artistic with the legal.”13 While most critics today argue that
law schools spend too much time on such pursuits, even outspoken critics of
legal education in the 1930s did not.14
Law teachers in the 1930s remembered all too well the battles that law
schools fought to earn academic parity with other university departments
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during the early Progressive era, an ordeal that lasted from the 1890s through
the 1920s.15 Christopher Columbus Langdell pioneered this project, in part by
hiring nonpractitioner teachers, declaring law a science, and promoting the
case method.16 Scholars such as Karl Llewellyn continued it, arguing that “the
background of social and economic fact and policy” should be integrated with
case materials lest law professors “fail of our job.”17 Meanwhile, law schools
worked steadfastly to acquire the same degree-granting privileges that other
university divisions enjoyed, a battle that became particularly intense over
the question of the doctorate in law, or J.D.18 As law schools lobbied to grant
doctorates, they found it necessary to overcome their trade school reputation
by deliberately making their programs more research-oriented.19 This struggle
coincided closely with a lengthening of the law school curriculum from two to
three and, in some cases, even four and five years.20
Taking Karl Llewellyn’s meditations on legal education as a lens, this Article
posits that the Depression-era law school crisis informs current debates about
the direction of legal education, in particular calls that law schools should
discourage theoretical scholarship in order to dedicate more time to practical
skills. While moving legal education in a more practical direction may have its
advantages, stripping the J.D. of its academic garb may not. Already, the Juris
Doctor demands a lighter research requirement than the Ph.D.; derobing it
further may only rekindle old critiques that law schools lack academic rigor
and, ultimately, legitimacy. Instead, reformers may be better off considering
the benefits of conferring plural law degrees—much as schools did in the past
—conferring Master’s degrees for less than three years of study, J.D. for three,
and S.J.D.s, or research doctorates, for more.
To elaborate, this Article proceeds in four additional parts. Part II recovers
the political history behind Langdell’s initial decision to elevate law teaching
beyond the trade school model, tying it first to the rise of the Bachelor’s and
then the Master’s degrees in law. Part III demonstrates how the Bachelor of
Laws degree grew from a two-year to a mandatory three-year program as law
schools struggled to improve their academic profiles within larger university
systems. Part IV shows how the Great Depression complicated this effort,
pushing many to question the length and value of legal education as law
15.
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firm hiring declined. Finally, Part V illustrates how reforms wrought during
the Depression introduced more theoretical work into the first three years,
reduced interest in optional graduate work, and set the stage for conferral of
the Juris Doctor, or J.D., on all law school graduates.21
While the history of legal education is nothing new, relatively little attention
has been paid to the precise manner in which curricular reform intersected
with the conferral of law school degrees.22 Yet the move to a single degree
did much to eliminate variation among schools, pushing all schools toward
a three-year template that stressed an “academic” approach.23 For schools
that either possessed or aspired to build a research reputation, this may have
been a good thing, even if it undermined support for advanced independent
research. However, for schools that did not aspire to be part of a larger research
university, the push for a Juris Doctor may have been a mistake.24
II. The Case Method as Practical Skills
Prior to the Civil War, legal education in America focused on the law
office.25 Aspiring attorneys worked as apprentices to experienced practitioners,
free from classroom instruction or formal academic supervision.26 Though a
few isolated law schools existed, universities generally struggled to mount
viable law programs.27 Princeton, George Washington, New York University
and Alabama all founded law schools during the antebellum period only to
promptly see them close for lack of enrollment.28
Following the Civil War, claims that apprenticeships lacked rigor began
to coalesce, particularly as the economy industrialized and legal markets
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grew.29 Top lawyers formed bar organizations, sponsored “systematic bar
examinations,” and called for “more rigorous training” of new attorneys.30
Some complained that law office apprenticeships proved erratic, leading to the
vetting of lawyers who had little general knowledge but were trained simply to
perform rote tasks.31 Others complained that the law office model lent itself to
political corruption, placing political acuity above legal acumen.32
One such critic was Christopher Columbus Langdell, a practicing attorney
in New York who had worked his way through Harvard Law School as a
librarian, taking three years rather than the customary one and a half.33 Upon
graduation, Langdell entered private practice in New York, spending much
of his time in the New York Law Institute’s library, one of the few libraries
open to attorneys at the time.34 Already trained as a librarian, Langdell quickly
developed a reputation for being one of the best-read lawyers in the city, a
person whom other attorneys in Manhattan came to consult.35 One such
lawyer, William Stanley, learned so much from Langdell that he offered him a
partnership in his firm, literally moving him—physically—into the firm’s office
space. “A narrow winding staircase,” recalled James Barr Ames, “led from
the office of [Stanley’s] firm to a room above, which was [Langdell’s] private
office, and adjoining it was his bedroom.”36
Langdell’s installation in Stanley’s office led many to suspect that the
young attorney prized books over clients, developing an aversion to practice
that would later color his approach to legal education.37 For example, many
attributed Langdell’s eventual development of the case method to his failings
as an attorney.38 Precisely because he spent most of his time in the library, they
argued, Langdell manufactured the idea that law was a “science” consisting
of “certain principles or doctrines,” each of which has evolved, over time, in
“slow degrees,” and “[t]his growth was to be traced in the main through a
29.
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series of cases.”39 Practitioners, even scholars, came to view this method as
the product of a lawyer “unready for the courtroom,” a “sensitive spectacled
student”, someone who remained “unduly trusting in knowledge from books,”
precisely because he could not hold his own against seasoned New York City
attorneys.40
Yet historian Bruce Kimball argues convincingly that even as Langdell
mined the library, so too did he became deeply involved in practice, serving
as lead or co-counsel in at least fifteen “prominent” cases between 1855 and
1870, meanwhile joining “the vanguard of those pioneering a new role in
litigation” by focusing more heavily on “extensive” brief writing than “oral
argument.”41 Thanks to his success, Langdell gained clients such as the Erie
Railroad, became known for possessing “the highest legal ability,” and argued
cases with “increasing frequency” during his time in New York.42 In fact,
Langdell’s success as a practicing attorney—not his naiveté—led him to become
estranged from the practicing bar precisely because he approached legal work
in a formal, assiduous manner, a tack that most office-trained attorneys in New
York found alien.43
The more Langdell succeeded as a practitioner, the more he became
convinced that law office apprenticeships fell short, leading to widespread
“ignorance” and “incompetence” within the bar.44 In New York, such
incompetence enjoyed the aid of an 1846 law making all state judges elected,
placing much of the city’s judiciary directly under the control of Tammany
Hall’s William “Boss” Tweed, who handed out judgeships as a form of
political patronage, often to supporters who had little if any legal training.45
Meanwhile, New York abolished “demanding examinations” for aspiring
attorneys that same year, lowering the “standards of expertise” required to
begin practice.46
Langdell further soured on the state of legal education in 1869, when he
personally represented the Northern Railroad Company in a case against
the state of New York, which prematurely declared the company insolvent.47
Well-versed in the newly enacted Field Code of civil procedure, Langdell
witnessed a partisan judge deride his carefully crafted legal brief as a “sham”
39.
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and “irrelevant.”48 Though Langdell was ultimately vindicated on appeal,
such experiences contributed to a general disillusionment on his part with the
state of legal practice and, by extension, legal education in America.49
Angered at the ineptitude of judges and practicing attorneys, Langdell
proposed a radical reform of legal education in 1870, shortly after Harvard
President Charles Eliot tapped him to head Harvard Law School.50 Once there,
Langdell devised a pedagogical method focused solely on the study of cases,
independent of either law office work or more traditional pedagogical models,
such as lecture.51 To illustrate, Langdell organized a course on Contracts that
required students to read “all the cases which had contributed in any important
degree to the growth, development, or establishment of any of [Contract’s]
essential doctrines.”52 Conceding that this included “an exceedingly small
proportion” of all the “reported” cases, Langdell nevertheless assembled a
sizable compendium.53 For the section of the course dedicated to the topic of
consideration, Langdell assigned no less than one hundred twenty-six cases,
most from England.54
Compared to other available texts at the time, Langdell’s casebook
differed dramatically in that it cast students into a sea of opinions without
any editorial comments or notes. For example, Langdell’s own teacher at
Harvard, Theophilus Parsons, “relegated all discussion of cases to notes” in his
Contracts textbook.55 Likewise, treatises popular with office-trained attorneys
such as Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England provided students with
a general overview of the law, sparing them the trouble of actually reading
judicial opinions.56
Bold in its departure from tradition, Langdell’s pedagogical “innovation”
sparked initial “hostility.”57 According to Langdell’s protégé James Barr Ames,
“[h]ardly one” of the lawyers in Boston at the time “had any faith in it,” nor
48.
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did most students seem to like it.58 After his first lecture based on the case
method, Langdell’s class enrollment “dwindled to a handful of students.”59
Many walked out of the room.60 Others chose not to enroll, leading to a
precipitous drop in Harvard’s class size.61
Langdell persisted. To bolster his new method, he encouraged the hiring
of law professors who had little, if any, legal experience. “What qualifies a
person … to teach law,” argued Langdell, “is not experience in the work of a
lawyer’s office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in the trial
or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in
learning law.”62 Langdell’s casebook explained why. He assigned his students
one hundred twenty-six cases on the substantive topic of consideration at a
time when most attorneys focused less on substantive topics than procedure,
particularly forms of pleading.63 As historian William LaPiana notes, leading
lawyers “lauded the ‘science’ of pleading” more than they did a command
of substantive topics, since forms of pleading tended to determine case
outcomes.64 Law teachers followed, publishing treatises on pleading that
became more popular than treatises on doctrinal subjects.65 According to law
professor James Gould, pleading comprised “the most important single title in
the law”, in part because all questions of common law depended on whether
they were accurately pled.66
Yet, pleading changed dramatically in 1848, when the state of New York
adopted a new Code of Procedure named after David Dudley Field.67
Enacted as part of a larger campaign of constitutional reform, the Field
Code did away with separate courts of law and equity, establishing a unified
“court of appeals.”68 Field had long argued for such a court, claiming that
complex disputes should be brought in one forum and “settled in one action,”
with pleadings that “told as simply as possible what happened,” not pleadings
that adhered to complex, predetermined forms.69 For the practicing lawyer, this
meant that attorneys did not simply need to know “the rules of pleading,” but
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Bruce A. Kimball, The Principle, Politics, and Finances of Introducing Academic Merit as the Standard of
Hiring for “the teaching of law as a career,” 1870-1900, 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 617, 626 (2006).

62.

Ames, supra note 33, at 477-78.

63.

Langdell, supra note 39, at 164-441.

64.

LaPiana, supra note 41, at 287.

65.

Id.

66.

Id. at 296.

67.

Id. at 304.

68.

Id. at 302.

69.

Id. at 305.

Bramble Bush Revisited

153

also “the legal principles” underlying their claims.70 This, in turn, encouraged
a renewed attention to cases. “Under the [Field] Code,” argues LaPiana, “the
careful lawyer had to concentrate on a close reading of earlier cases to find
a narrower sort of precedent—one in which the facts resembled the case at
hand.”71
For Langdell, the Field Code coincided nicely with his new approach
to legal education, one focused less on pleadings and more on cases. The
more students engaged in “the careful searching of past cases for particular
circumstances,” he believed, the better they would be at providing “analogies”
for use in Field Code pleadings.72 Langdell’s own career demonstrated the
logic of such an approach. While other lawyers exploited political connections
and mastered procedural forms, Langdell built his reputation on reading
cases, eventually developing an encyclopedic knowledge of New York law that
garnered him a regional reputation.
Precisely because private study bolstered his career, Langdell came to
believe that those best-equipped to instruct students were those who excelled
at case work in school, not necessarily those who succeeded in practice. This
may have stemmed from his own experience. Long before Langdell entered
the practicing bar, he worked as a research assistant to Harvard Law professor
Theophilus Parsons, who pushed him and his fellow assistants to digest over
six thousand cases for his treatise on contracts.73
This point warrants some comment. Prior to Langdell, law students could
be successful without learning much about cases, absorbing most of their
information through general lecture.74 At Columbia University, for example,
law professor James Kent noted that the school dedicated a mere four lectures
to the entire subject of Contracts in its first-year curriculum, leaving students
with little sense of where the principles of contract derived, or how they applied
in specific circumstances.75 Lawyers trained in law offices arguably knew even
less. Even those who augmented their practical training with independent
study of sources such as Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,
ended up knowing next to nothing about judicial opinions: how they were
crafted, what legal principles they held, or how they might be synthesized.76
For example, Blackstone dedicated one chapter in his four-volume treatise
to the subject of Contracts, presenting little more than a general overview of
70.
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contract doctrine.77 To make matters worse, no headnote system existed, most
cases were not reported, and judges in cities such as New York tended to rule
based on their professional connections and political leanings.78 For this very
reason, Langdell actually became convinced that practitioners threatened to
inculcate the wrong values in students, instilling “the arts of chicane and selfpromotion,” not doctrinal expertise or logical consistency.79
Suspicious of the notion that practice made for sound pedagogy, Langdell
revolutionized law school teaching, a point historians have long recognized.
Yet, as the next section shall demonstrate, Langdell’s reforms intersected
in subtle ways with a larger law school interest in being considered equal,
academic partners in university systems. Critical to this move was an effort to
boost admissions criteria, curricular content, and law school length.
III. A Second Bachelor’s in Three Years
As Langdell reformed legal pedagogy, law schools worked diligently to
make entrance into their programs more competitive. In 1876, Columbia
became the first law school to require an entrance exam, though it applied
only to applicants who had not graduated from a “literary college.”80 College
graduates were “admitted without examination” under the theory that they
had already proved their academic merit.81 Non-graduates, on the other hand,
had to pass an entrance exam on “Greek and Roman History,” the “History
of England and of the United States (of North America), English Grammar,
Rhetoric, and finally “the principles of composition” as used “in Caesar’s Gallic
War (entire), six books of Virgil’s Aeneid,” and “six orations of Cicero.”82
At the time, Columbia required only two years of study, a span that Professor
John W. Burgess attacked as insufficient in 1881.83 Burgess proposed a threeyear program before students could qualify for a “Bachelor of Laws” degree.84
A majority of the faculty disagreed, arguing that students should gain a
Bachelor’s after two years, with the option of continuing on for a third year
to earn a “Master of Laws” degree.85 Columbia University President Frederick
Barnard balked at such a move, declaring the mere notion that a student
who had not attended college might gain entrance to Columbia Law School
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and receive a master’s degree within three years to be a “farce.”86 Instead,
Barnard proposed that only students who boasted both a Bachelor of Laws
and a Bachelor of Arts degree should be admitted into the optional, thirdyear master’s program.87 One advantage of such a program, argued Barnard,
was that it “would bring in additional revenue without incurring additional
expenses.”88 Another advantage was that it would better-position Columbia
vis-à-vis Harvard and Yale, both of which adopted an optional third year for
those interested in a master’s degree in the 1880s.89 Despite initial reluctance,
the Board of Trustees in 1888 finally approved a mandatory third year for all
students interested in pursuing a Bachelor of Laws degree, making Columbia
the first law school not only to implement an admissions exam but also to
require a mandatory three-year course of study.90
This warrants some comment. Rather than respond to a clear and compelling
need, say a demand for a year of supervised clinical work akin to medical school
residencies, the mandatory third year at Columbia focused more specifically
on deepening students’ understanding of doctrinal subjects. As Professor
Dwight put it in 1890, the theory behind the third year is the “assumption that
a student in going through the two years’ course has obtained a good general
outline of the law, and is now prepared to take up special subjects in detail.”91
Such subjects, continued Dwight, included topics of “intrinsic importance,”
matters frequently used “in the affairs of life,” and areas of unusual difficulty,
including Corporations, Federal Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Law.92
Not all agreed with the merits of such an approach. Some argued that
charging one more year’s tuition discriminated against less affluent students,
reserving law school to the “sons of wealthy families.”93 Others complained
that the move to three years aimed to shift the emphasis of the school away
from practical training and toward more theoretical concerns.94 As one student
put it, the third year amounted to little more than “padding out the course with
‘political science,’” an oblique reference to an effort by University President
Seth Low to integrate programming and build bridges between departments,
all part of raising Columbia College to the status of a university.95 Among
Low’s directives was a requirement that all applicants to law school first
complete “three years of college,” and that the second year of law school be
86.
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dedicated to more explicitly academic concerns, including forty lectures in
political science.96
That the law school suffered pressure from the university to focus on
theoretical, interdisciplinary courses is worth noting. Though training attorneys
remained a core aspect of the school’s mission, so too did the institution aspire
to remain a respected division of the larger university; a place supportive
of research and theoretical work. For example, law professor John Burgess
delivered lectures on decidedly non-skills-based courses such as Comparative
Law, Constitutional History, Diplomatic History, and International Law as
early as the 1870s.97 At the time, Burgess hoped to “neutralize the intense
professionalism of the Law School” by lecturing on public law subjects, in
essence providing a counterpoint to the school’s exclusive focus on training
attorneys.98 As Burgess put it, he hoped to elevate the academic reputation
of the school “by supplementing the studies in Private Law,” contracts,
corporations, wills, and so on, with “studies in Ethics, History, and Public
Law,” all of which he grouped together as integral parts of “the science of
Jurisprudence.”99 He also hoped to train students for positions in government,
a dream that his successors would take up during the Great Depression.100
While the private law faculty tolerated Burgess, some viewed his theoretical
courses to be better-suited for advanced candidates with academic aspirations.
Such was the view of Professor Theodore Dwight, who argued that courses in
public law should be reserved for an optional, postgraduate year of study.101
Specifically, Dwight argued for an elective third year devoted to theoretical
and/or public law topics, resulting in a Master of Laws degree.102 Of course,
this was before the law school moved to a mandatory third year. Had the law
school moved to such a year in 1878 rather than 1888, Burgess might have
succeeded in molding the third-year curriculum. As it was, however, he met
96.
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100. Not simply an academic, Burgess hoped that training in political science might also prepare
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significant resistance to merging theoretical work with private law courses in
the limited two-year program that still existed in the 1870s.103
Frustrated, Burgess requested and received permission to found a separate
School of Political Science, the university’s first “nonprofessional graduate
school” in 1880.104 As political science broke from law, it left the private law
faculty, and the case method, ascendant.105 Few personified this transition
better than William Albert Keener, a Harvard hire who rejected the lecture
approach of men such as Burgess and worked diligently to nudge his
colleagues in the direction of the case method, arguing that it offered a more
rigorous training than lectures and recitations. Like Langdell, Keener believed
that after studying a series of cases, students left class better-trained, more
conversant on the particulars of legal doctrine, and better able to extract
general rules from a set of specific circumstances. Others articulated this view
as well. For example, Eugene Wambaugh noted in his 1894 treatise The Study
of Cases that “having collected several cases bearing more or less directly upon
the point,” students subsequently “attempt[] by combination and comparison
to ascertain what doctrine is to be deduced from the cases taken together.”106
This process of “combining and comparing cases” assumed a quasi-scientific
aspect, involving the same “methods of induction” used by scientists to analyze
experiments, though the experiments were replaced by “many thousands” of
cases.107 Precisely for this reason, law teachers who had not practiced stood an
equal if not better chance of successfully guiding students through the study
of cases, a form of pedagogy that had little to do with real-world experience.108
Yet students were not unanimously pleased. While some appreciated the
victory of the case method over “attorneyism,” others lamented the new
teaching style, as Harvard students had more than two decades before; they
also protested the extra third year.109 A significant number of students in the
Class of 1892 refused to stay for the extra year, opting to simply take the Bar
exam without graduating.110 A similarly minded cadre of faculty members
defected from Columbia and formed a rival school, the New York Law School,
dedicated to opposing the case method and maintaining a two-year program.111
By 1904, New York Law School had become the biggest law school in the
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 87-89.
106. Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases: A Course of Instruction 67 (2d ed. 1894).
107. Id. at 67-68.
108. See LaPiana, supra note 41, at 296-97 (describing some academics’ use of, and penchant for,
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United States, even as Columbia saw its enrollment drop precipitously.112 Yet
Columbia persisted, led in large part by Keener’s growing conviction that the
study of cases imparted the most practical skill of all, namely the ability to
engage in “legal thinking and legal reasoning.”113
So dominant became Keener’s emphasis on reasoning that the more
academically minded faculty conceded his method to the first three years,
arguing that students interested in theoretical work should be allowed to
remain on for a fourth optional year, resulting in a Master of Laws degree.114
Granted in conjunction with the Faculty of Political Science, the Master of
Laws required that students take additional courses either in the law school
or the School of Political Science, including courses on economics, history,
and public law.115 At the end of their year, applicants sat for examinations
in Comparative Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Roman Law,
International Law, History, Economics, and Social Ethics.116 However, no
express research requirement was imposed.117
112. Id.
113.

Id. at 152-55. As Columbia joined Harvard in transforming legal education, not all law
schools followed; many remaining faithful to older methods through the 1890s. To take
just a few examples, Georgia Law School boasted nine instructors in 1891–all practitioners–
teaching 14 students. The first year consisted of lectures on Blackstone’s Commentaries,
Brown’s Commentaries (Contracts and Torts), the Constitution of the United States, the
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the Georgia Penal Code, and Ewell’s Medical Jurisprudence. Rather than rely on the case
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work” also comprised the primary mode of legal pedagogy at Yale Law School in 1891,
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American Law, International Law, and “Forensic Pleading,” as well as standard courses such
as Evidence, Contracts, and Torts. At Washington University in St. Louis, students relied
on “lecture and recitation from text-books” to learn Real Property, Personal Property, Torts,
Contracts, Causes of Action Between Tort and Contract, and a “daily course of lessons
upon elementary law, both civil and criminal until Christmas vacation.” American Bar
Association, Courses of Study in Law Schools in 1891 (1893), reprinted in 1 The History of
Legal Education in the United States, supra note 27, at 542, 544-56. Such methods–heavily
reliant on lectures and recitations–lent themselves to the study of English law, particularly
English common law, and to an early version of legal history–an “institutional-evolutionary”
approach that conveyed American law as “a long, continuous process beginning in the
ancient Teutonic forests.” Robert W. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in
American Legal Historiography, Law & Society (1975), reprinted in Main Themes in United States
Constitutional and Legal History: Major Historical Essays 152, 158 (Kermit L. Hall,
ed., 1987). Yet such an approach declined from 1900 to 1930, notes historian Robert W.
Gordon, as legal “history, such as liberal learning generally in that period, fell victim to the
case method’s exclusive claim on the … law curriculum.” Id. at 161.
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Columbia’s decision to award a master’s degree after four years was
noteworthy; evidence that the school was resolving the tension between
practical skills and research by relegating practical skills to the Bachelor of
Laws, meanwhile elevating research to the master’s level. This satisfied the
predominantly private, practitioner-oriented faculty by not watering down
their curriculum, even as it maintained the law school’s academic profile by
reserving theoretical work for advanced study. Finally, reserving the master’s
for those who took interdisciplinary courses in political science went far toward
preserving a meaningful distinction between the degrees.
Yet, some wanted the school to go even further. As early as 1908, University
President Nicholas Butler proposed to the Trustees a doctorate in law, or
“Doctor Juris,” to the Trustees.118 However, faculty in Political Science and
Philosophy balked at such a move, afraid that it would cheapen the university’s
Doctor of Philosophy, or Ph.D.119 To accommodate such concerns, the law
school agreed to a “compromise scheme” by which “the doctorate in law” would
“be administered by a joint committee of the Faculties of Political Science,
Philosophy, Pure Science, and Law, so as to maintain common standards for
the two degrees.”120 The Trustees approved a “Doctor Juris” in 1923.121
The Juris Doctor dramatically increased interdisciplinary offerings at
Columbia, as “the Faculties of Political Science, Business, and Philosophy”
all offered “seminars and problem courses” to doctoral candidates in the
law school.122 The doctorate also increased the emphasis on research at the
school, offering students the opportunity to complete a substantive research
project, or dissertation.123 Students who undertook to write a dissertation
received a Master of Laws after one year of coursework and were then allowed
to complete their dissertation in absentia.124 Thus, the law school assumed
a degree structure not unlike the rest of the university, with a bachelor’s for
preliminary work and a master’s and doctorate for advanced, theoretical study.
Yet not all members of the faculty were satisfied, some arguing that the
law school should jettison its emphasis on training practitioners completely
and focus instead on pure research.125 One such professor, Herman Oliphant,
118. Id. at 292-93.
119. Id. at 295-96.
120. Id. at 296.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 333.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 301-02. In 1924, for example, Columbia Law School Dean Harlan Fiske Stone declared
that while the case method was helpful in negotiating “the jungle of judicial decisions,”
law professors should not approach legal teaching as simply a “hermetically sealed
compartment.” Instead, they should look to the “social and economic forces” that gave
law its “form and substance.” Harlan Fiske Stone, Some Phases of Legal Education in America,
58 Am. L. Rev. 747, 752, 754 (1924). Such critiques were made by other scholars as well, at
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wrote to Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler in 1923 asking
him to approve “[more] concentrated research on the interrelation of law to
the other social sciences—research so concentrated that it ought to be the sole
concern of the School, to the exclusion of everything else.”126 Butler denied
the request, but the issue reemerged in a self-study completed in 1928 that
divided the faculty.127 According to Oliphant and others, the school should
“abandon its traditional purpose of preparing students for practice” and focus
instead on devoting itself “to critical, constructive, creative research.”128 A
contingent of professors lobbied for Oliphant to become dean, a move that
met resistance from the rest of the faculty, including the university president.129
As “deadlock[]” ensued, President Butler sided against Oliphant and in favor
of more moderate candidate Young B. Smith, prompting an “immediate
uproar” that resulted in resignations by Oliphant and friends, including Leon
Marshall, Underhill Moore, Hessel E. Yntema, and future Supreme Court
Justice William O. Douglas.130
Following the “secession” at Columbia, Dean Smith defused remaining
tensions by endorsing both academic research and practical preparation,
augmenting traditional courses with offerings that approached “the study
of law in terms of underlying political, economic, and social factors.”131 This
included retaining standard courses such as Civil Procedure, Corporations,
and Partnerships, meanwhile adding nondoctrinal courses on “public law,
legal history, and jurisprudence.”132 The latter aimed at “reevaluat[ing] legal
institutions in terms of their effects, in order that the law might be more
usefully employed, and to revise their curricula and methods of teaching so
as to accustom lawyers to the use of knowledge derived from other fields of
knowledge.”133
other schools. In 1915, for example, Harvard Law Professor Felix Frankfurter noted that the
“growing legislative activity of the time”–much of it spawned by progressive attempts to deal
with dislocations caused by urbanization and monopoly power–should guide law schools
in revising their curricula, moving them away from strict adherence to the case method and
toward a more normative, policy-oriented approach.” Felix Frankfurter, The Law and the Law
Schools, 1 A.B.A. J. 532, 535, 539 (1915).
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While such courses had long been reserved for upper-level study, specifically
the master’s and doctorate degrees, now they emerged in the required threeyear curriculum. Yet the case method remained dominant. Even faculty with
interdisciplinary interests like Karl Llewellyn extolled it, as he made clear
during his introductory “Bramble Bush” lectures to first-years in 1929.134 During
those talks, Llewellyn stressed the value of the training that the students
were about to receive. “We have discovered,” he began, “that students who
come eager to learn the rules, and who do learn them, and who learn nothing
more, will take away the shell and not the substance” of legal education.135
That substance, he continued, came in part from the study of cases, precisely
because they demonstrated how “general proposition[s]” were best illustrated
by focusing on “concrete instances” of the way general principles applied to
specific circumstances.136
Simply imparting general principles, argued Llewellyn, “hinder[ed]”
rather than “help[ed]” instruction because the practice of law focused less on
imparting rules than resolving “disputes.”137 Such disputes were relevant to
attorneys precisely because their “oldest job” was to serve as “advocate[s,]”
for clients, both by counseling them and lobbying on their behalf in court.138
“Lawyers are lawyers because they alone among men devote themselves with
some constancy to studying out what courts are going to do,” he argued.139
What courts did played directly into the identification and comprehension
of legal rules. Once students had deciphered the language of each case,
maintained Llewellyn, then they were to identify the dispute in question,
remembering that courts only decide a “particular dispute” “according to a
general rule.”140 At the “kernel” of each opinion, he continued, lay the “rule
of the case.”141 Hence, by reading through a series of cases students came to
learn not only the general rule, but how that rule applied in different contexts.
Further, students learned to decipher which facts were relevant and which
were irrelevant to comprehending rules, a process arrived at through a series
of questions.142 Once students identified the relevant facts, they then moved to
the rule of the case, and were subsequently pushed to compare that case with
others. To Llewellyn, the comparing of more than one case “brings us at last,”
134. Born in 1893, Llewellyn rose rapidly through the ranks of legal education, joining the faculty
at Columbia in 1924. Goebel, supra note 18, at 280-81.
135. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 2.
136. Id.
137.
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he noted, “to the case system.”143 Simply reading one case on a legal topic, he
argued, was futile, for “no case can have a meaning by itself.”144 “Standing
alone,” he maintained, cases provided “no guidance” into legal rules. What
gave students “sureness” was relating “the background” of different cases,
forming the “foundation of the case system.”145 To Llewellyn, the case system
was itself a type of game, a “game of matching cases,” that “proceed[ed]” by
“a rough application of the logical method of comparison and difference.”146
Llewellyn’s lectures revealed that the case method had done more than
simply prepare students for practice under the Field Code; it had also achieved
Keener’s objective of imparting a particular way of thinking.147 “From this
angle, moreover,” he wrote, “you will observe another value in the study of the
cases.148 Each opinion is an example of legal reasoning—Where do the quotes
begin and end in this sentence? Check your source. Could not locate within
the source either with and from prior cases.”149 He warned against students
going “too early to the writers” of treatises, noting that “[t]o do so is to come
under strong temptation to skip through the process of case matching.”150
By matching cases, students honed their analytical skills, developing a more
rigorous habit of reasoning than if they had simply read treatises outlining the
general principles of law.151
Llewellyn’s exuberance over the case method underscores the extent to
which the approach had come to dominate legal education by the close of
the 1920s, even after scholars such as Oliphant argued for a more contextual
course of study. As we have seen, the method’s initial adoption bore a
distinctly practice-oriented objective, one that coincided with Langdell’s own
practice experience and with changes in pleading wrought by New York’s
Field Code.152 By 1929, however, the popularity of the method far exceeded its
relevance simply to procedural rules in New York. As Columbia Law School
Professor William Keener put it, the method developed “reasoning powers,”
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in part by inculcating “legal analysis and synthesis.”153 Future Supreme
Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone reiterated this point, noting that the case
method ultimately helped elevate law schools to their “proper relation” with
the American university, in part by instilling “a more profound knowledge of
legal principles” that transcended technical training.154 According to historian
Julius Goebel, “the widespread adoption of the case method” in American law
schools led legal education to become “highly standardized” by 1920, based
heavily on an “accepted pattern of [case] study.”155
Yet, the case method’s ascension would face a unique challenge during the
Great Depression, as the next section will show. Law teachers at Columbia, in
particular, moved to broaden legal education not simply by adding public law
courses to the traditional curriculum, but transforming that curriculum itself,
de-emphasizing the case method and including interdisciplinary components
within traditional courses as early as the first and second year. This move
invariably exploded the tiered approach to legal education established by
Columbia in the 1920s, a fracturing brought on by slowdowns in hiring resulting
from the Great Depression. As the nation sank into a decade of decline,
some even blamed the case method for contributing to the crisis. As we shall
see, critics agreed that the preparation of practice-ready attorneys remained
paramount, even as law schools required a more expansive, interdisciplinary
curriculum.
IV. Llewellyn & the Depression
When Karl Llewellyn delivered his first Bramble Bush address to law students
in the fall of 1929, few anticipated the economic crisis about to hit the nation.156
Even the “avalanche of liquidation” that rocked the stock market on Tuesday,
October 23rd, did not strike observers as the beginning of a decade-long crisis,
some foolishly heralding the crash as a “long-predicted” market “correction”
likely to “purge the economic system of unhealthy toxins.”157 Similar sentiments
held through the following year, leading many to conclude as late as December
1930 that the nation was simply “caught up in yet another of the routine
business-cycle downswings” that “periodically” affected America’s “boomand-bust economy.”158 Perhaps for these reasons, Karl Llewellyn expressed
little consternation in his Bramble Bush lectures that legal education was either
in crisis or in need of change.159
153. Goebel, supra note 18, at 154-55.
154. Stone, supra note 125, at 751.
155. Goebel, supra note 18, at 297.
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By 1935, however, things had worsened. Few could deny that the country
was in the midst of “a colossal financial meltdown” affecting “not only the
notoriously idle rich” but “struggling neighborhood banks, hard-earned
retirement nest eggs, and college and university endowments.”160 America’s
gross domestic product fell by half its 1929 level, “millions” lost their homes,
and “25 percent of the work force” found itself jobless.161 According to Columbia
Law Professor Herbert Wechsler, the Depression “had a damned demoralizing
effect” on recent law graduates, not least because “jobs were scarce,” but also
because “salaries were low.”162 Even “large and well-established” firms such
as Sullivan & Cromwell, Davis Polk, and Cravath, De Gersdorff, Swaine &
Wood posted only “rare vacancies,” pushing many to find work at “much
smaller outfits” for “very little return.”163
As the magnitude of the crisis became apparent, Karl Llewellyn revised
his opinions on legal education. In a lecture delivered at Harvard on January
22, 1935, he announced that legal education had become “blind,” “inept,”
“factory-ridden,” “wasteful,” “defective,” and “empty.”164 Part of law school’s
problem, began Llewellyn, was that it had lost touch with the kinds of jobs
that law graduates actually acquired, focusing too heavily on corporate “legal
factory-hand” work and not enough on students who went into small firms,
politics, and “government administration,” a “recent trend” at Columbia given
the slowdown in big-firm hiring.165
If law schools did not adapt, warned Llewellyn, their “existing bankruptcy”
would become “an open shame.”166 “Demands on us rise by the hour,” he
lamented. “We have taken coin, we have usurped status, under the pretense
of training for the law.”167 To Llewellyn’s mind, European schools provided an
alternate model of legal education, aspects of which were worth replicating in
the United States. In Germany, for example, students completed three years
of coursework only to then begin “a further three years of directed, rounded,
apprenticeship,” funded in part by the government, which provided students
160. Kennedy, supra note 156, at 162.
161. Id. at 163.
162. The Reminiscences of Herbert Wechsler, Interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with
Herbert Wechsler, Professor, Columbia Law School, in New York, NY. (Aug. 11, 1978 & Feb.
23, 1979), at 58 [hereinafter Reminiscences].
163. Id. at 59. During the Depression, many states raised their educational requirements to enter
the bar, in part out of fear that the market would be oversaturated with attorneys. Stevens,
supra note 15, at 177. For the Depression’s impact on Boston schools, particularly Suffolk
University Law School, see Appleman, supra note 49, at 271. Cravath, Swaine and Moore was
then named Cravath, De Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood. Goebel supra note 18, at 328.
164. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 653.
165. Id. at 654-56.
166. Id. at 657.
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with a “modest stipend.”168 “What have we done,” asked Llewellyn, along
similar lines? The answer was, nothing. American schools “face[d] the absence
of any apprenticeship at all,” he noted, implying that some form of law office
training needed to be returned to the law school curriculum.169
Yet, even as Llewellyn endorsed a return to practice, he by no means
abandoned the case for academics. In fact, he lobbied for something arguably
new in legal education, a merger of case study with contextual material.
“[W]e either integrate the background of social and economic fact and policy”
into law school courses, argued Llewellyn, “or fail of our job.”170 This was
new, particularly in the context of private law courses. Yet Llewellyn believed
strongly that such courses warranted revision, and that a purely academic
faculty possessed the best qualifications for doing so. To his mind, academic,
full-time faculty remained the most able to provide “perspective” on the case
method, including “social and economic fact and policy.”171 The reason for
this, he posited, was that “legal rules” by themselves meant “next to nothing,”
and that students needed to understand the context of such rules in order
to effectively counsel clients.172 Such contingencies included an inquiry into
sociology and political science, something that lawyers were poorly equipped
to provide.173 “[W]hen it comes to broadly social facts, in their social bearings,
lawyers are helpless,” argued Llewellyn. “They fall for the tripe that journalists
talk”—a colorful way of saying that lawyers lacked critical perspective,
preferring instead to “manhandle statistics” for tactical reasons.174
Convinced of the importance of an interdisciplinary approach, Llewellyn
called for reform, modifying his longstanding endorsement of the case method
with calls for new approaches to legal pedagogy, including an emphasis on
nontraditional, interdisciplinary material.175 “The need is,” he exclaimed, “for
an integration of the human and the artistic with the legal,” ultimately with an
eye to broadening the career opportunities of law school graduates who may not
receive jobs as “legal factory-hand[s]” in large corporate firms—what Llewellyn
termed the “upper reaches of the corporation-factory.”176 The economic strain
of the Great Depression loomed large in Llewellyn’s arguments, pushing him
168. Id. at 658. Laura Appleman argues that German legal training influenced American law
schools prior to the Depression by encouraging higher admission standards and a greater
emphasis on scholarship. Llewellyn’s invocation of German legal pedagogy during the
Depression suggests that this influence continued. See Appleman, supra note 49, at 274-77.
169. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 657.
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to acknowledge the need for new approaches given new market conditions,
particularly the decline of big-firm hiring and the “recent trend” of jobs in
“government administration,” particularly Roosevelt’s New Deal.177
However, Llewellyn revealed some concern about mounting
interdisciplinary, nondoctrinal courses such as “Legal History, Legal
Philosophy, and Jurisprudence.”178 Noting that earlier reformers had rushed
to “pile on” such courses in a “fourth year” of law school, Llewellyn countered
that three years was ample time to gain a satisfactory legal education, provided
that professors recognized the importance “of integrating background—
social or philosophical—into every course.”179 “[C]ritique is of the essence,”
he maintained, “not only of understanding and reform, but of practice,”;
therefore law professors should strive to provide “background” material
“as an inevitable part of the rule-material studied.”180 “The professor’s job,”
concluded Llewellyn, involves incorporating the “fact-background necessary
to give to a policy-inquiry interest; to a rule, meaningfulness; to a counsellingquestion [sic], body; [and] to a critical evaluation, hands and feet.”181
Llewellyn’s interest in augmenting the case method with external materials
is worth noting. Columbia had long mounted nondoctrinal courses, as we have
seen. However, such courses tended to accumulate at the master’s and doctoral
level, not during the first three years. Now, Llewellyn proposed that the entire
curriculum assume an interdisciplinary, policy-centered cast, including even
private law courses traditionally taught via the case method.
However, in a manner that is worth noting today, Llewellyn did not
view a more interdisciplinary focus to be less practical.182 “I think the most
lamentable thing about American legal education,” he declared during a talk
at Duke Law School in 1936, “is it has taken into account neither the society in
which the job must be performed nor what we are educating for.”183 Foremost
in Llewellyn’s mind was the cost of legal education and the need to represent
the poor, both complicated by calls for “standards” from practitioners and
bar associations.184 “Who,” asked Llewellyn, “is going to spend four years in
college and three years in law school and five years building up a practice to
go down and work for $5.00 or $10.00 on a case[?]”185 Legal clinics, he argued,
were simply not staffed well enough to address the need for “poor man’s law
177.
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work,” particularly at a moment when more than half the population found
itself mired in poverty.186
Next, Llewellyn blasted legal education for failing “to equip” students “for
the practice of law.”187 “How is it possible,” he argued, “for three years’ law
school and one bar examination to equip a man for the practice of law?”188
Though he had not expressed it as a concern during his Bramble Bush talks,
Llewellyn suddenly seemed extremely interested in the incorporation of
apprenticeships into the law school curriculum, perhaps because law firms
had stopped hiring students with little or no practice experience.189 “Where
is the apprenticeship here?” he wondered, rejecting Langdell’s view that law
teaching should be separate from practice.190 “[E]very lawyer,” he observed,
“hires a kid at a loss for the first six months at least,” something fewer firms
proved willing to do under Depression-era constraints.191 “We need an
apprenticeship again,” announced Llewellyn, alluding to the pre-Langdellian
days of law office learning.192
Even as he called for a return to antebellum apprenticeships, however,
Llewellyn did not reject the case method. Provided that cases were not
overedited, they too served a practical purpose; they were “concrete.”193
“Every case in an office is new,” he declared, and “[y]ou can help get ready for
that, with your casebook.”194 However, overedited casebooks were dangerous.
“Many casebooks,” posited Llewellyn, “edit their facts right out of the picture,”
reducing their utility to “a bunch of judicial essays, each about nothing
concrete and rather badly put together.”195 The end result of this trend, he
announced, was that students did not “begin to learn law” until they were “out
of law school” and, when they did, it was “in spite of” their teachers.196
Amid his drubbing of legal pedagogy, Llewellyn made an odd claim. “I think
that one of the things that goes to make lawyers is to make the law a cultural
study.”197 He noted that calls for “culture with a Capital ‘C’” had existed for
decades, adding worthwhile courses in “Roman Law, Jurisprudence, and the
186. Id.
187. Id. at 23.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 22.
194. Id. at 23.
195. Id. at 22.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 24.
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then still unfamiliar fields of Constitutional Law” and “Administrative Law.”198
But, argued Llewellyn, law schools needed to do more, “to make the meaning
of law to human people take on the same color that it has in a well-written
drama,—a thing of excitement.”199 He summarized by saying that “the best
two lines” of improving legal education were to develop “sounder technical
training” and also “the development of a realistic sense on the basis of fact,” in
particular the interaction of legal doctrine with evolving customs.200
Concerned with the cost of legal education and the practicality of legal
training, Llewellyn remained mindful that interdisciplinary methods could
still be relevant to preparing students for other types of work, particularly
policy work in the New Deal. As the private sector shrank, Columbia realized
that one of the few areas of job growth in the country lay in government service,
particularly as the Roosevelt administration endorsed the creation of new
federal agencies and, with them, new federal responsibilities.201 As Columbia
Law Professor Julius Goebel noted, the New Deal generated a “phenomenal
increase in governmental functions,” many of which required “competent
lawyers.”202 Recognizing an emerging market for graduates, Columbia worked
diligently to refashion itself into a “training place for public service,” in part
by emphasizing “the importance of integrating work in public law into the
professional law curriculum.”203 Fueling this move, confirmed Goebel, was
the “decline of employment by law offices” caused by the rigors of the Great
Depression.”204 While training students for government service had once been
a prominent goal of Professor John Burgess, its primary advocate during the
1930s would be a much younger professor of Criminal Law, Herbert Wechsler.
As the next section shall demonstrate, Wechsler joined an assault on the case
method that would intersect in important ways with the decline of the LL.B.
and the rise of the J.D.
V. The Case Method on Trial
As the nation sank into Depression, members of Columbia’s faculty began
to call for new approaches to pedagogy, including a reconsideration of the role
of public law in the law school curriculum.205 One reason for such requests
was a hope that students might gain jobs in federal offices involved in the
New Deal, prompted by “the phenomenal increase in governmental functions
during the early thirties” coupled with the “coincident decline of employment
198. Id. at 23.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 24.
201. Kennedy, supra note 156, at 149.
202. Goebel, supra note 18, at 325.
203. Id. at 325.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 325-27.
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by law offices due to the rigors of the Great Depression.”206 Another was
political. Perhaps no faculty member demonstrated this more clearly than
Assistant Professor Herbert Wechsler.207 Hired in 1933 to invigorate the
teaching of public law at Columbia, Wechsler agreed to teach Criminal Law
in the first year, replacing the more traditional private law course in Business
Organization.208 The new professor happened to believe that the Great
Depression had been caused in part by a blind faith in the market, an overenthusiasm for laissez faire capitalism that ignored “the abuse and dislocation
incident to the development of an industrial society.”209 Such factors
contributed to the economic crisis, believed Wechsler, and made a mockery
of the formalist premise that economic affairs were best-managed through the
private adjudication of legal disputes.210 The case method further confounded
the problem, argued Wechsler, precisely because it perpetuated what Roscoe
Pound called the common law’s “antipathy to legislation,” its tacit dismissal
of state regulation as a lesser form of lawmaking than the private ordering of
property and contract.211 Even as culturally minded scholars such as Llewellyn
clung to Langdell in the midst of the howling 1930s, in other words, Wechsler
began to view the study of cases in expressly political terms as limiting, even
dangerous. Not surprisingly, he turned to earlier thinkers who had long called
for curricular reform, law teachers such as Felix Frankfurter among them.212
To Herbert Wechsler and his senior colleague Jerome Michael, Frankfurter
provided theoretical ammunition for fighting the nation’s frightening plunge
into economic recession, a recession accelerated by doctrinal formalism.213
Frankfurter’s conviction that students should be taught that law is “an
206. Id. at 325.
207. Id. at 325-27.
208. Id. at 326.
209. Reminiscences, supra note 162, at 51.
210. Wechsler’s charge that the case method promoted a “closed system” anticipated arguments
made in the 1960s and 70s’ that Lochner-era jurisprudence reflected a “formalist” approach to
law. As historian Brian Tamanaha shows, such allegations misrepresented judicial behavior
during the progressive period and stemmed from scholars who “worked at elite law schools”
and “were politically on the left.” See Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 54, 61. Wechsler, too, had
close ties to the left, suggesting an instrumental explanation for the reason scholars may
have deliberately characterized late-19th- and early-20th- century jurisprudence as formalist.
For Wechsler’s left-wing affiliations during the 1930s, see Anders Walker, Neutral Principles:
Rethinking the Legal History of Civil Rights, 1934-1964 40 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 385 (2009).
211. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L. J. 454, 462 (1909).
212. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 125. Interestingly, Wechsler’s relationship with Frankfurter
lent more than just intellectual support to his decision to break from the case method and
produce a different type of lawyer trained to work in administrative agencies. Due to the
connections that he had with the Roosevelt administration, Frankfurter became a “one-man
employment agency” for recent law graduates interested in working for federal New Deal
agencies. Kennedy, supra note 156, at 121. Though he would later become more conservative,
Roscoe Pound also called for curricular reform. Pound, supra note 211, at 470.
213. See supra note 209.
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instrument” to be used for “human betterment” impressed them, as did
Frankfurter’s support for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.214
Both Wechsler and Michael proudly endorsed Roosevelt, standing out as two
of only five “New Dealers” on Columbia’s law faculty at the time.215 When
the Supreme Court began striking down New Deal programs such as the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the National Industrial Recovery
Act on what they believed were overtly formalist, “closed system” grounds,
both Wechsler and Michael placed at least some blame at the feet of the case
method for producing a socially isolated, politically unresponsive judiciary.216
As Wechsler later remembered it, the Court possessed no “receptivity to
statutory changes of the common law,” lacked any “sympathetic treatment of
administrative agencies,” and clung desperately to the notion of the common
law as a “closed system,” a position that deserved “unqualified disdain.”217
Rather than view law as a closed system, Wechsler came to view it in more
“utilitarian” terms, as an instrument of “statecraft” that could be used to pull
the country out of its fiscal woes.218 Before this could happen, however, lawyers
and law students needed to learn to think about the law differently; as a tool
for change and not a prophylactic to state intervention and control. Wechsler
distilled these notions into four separate “articles of faith” that guided his legal
career.219 They included: 1) a rejection of the common law as a “closed system,”
2) an emphasis on “judicial receptivity to statutory changes of the common
law,” 3) a presumption that “legal understanding is imperfectly obtained”,
and 4) an “unqualified disdain” for the Supreme Court’s formalist destruction
of New Deal programs “despite the magnitude of the abuse and dislocation
incident to the development of an industrial society.”220
Wechsler let his “articles of faith” guide his selection of materials for
teaching criminal law.221 Not offered at Columbia prior to Wechsler’s arrival
on the faculty in 1931, criminal law had been virtually ignored because it was
“generally thought to have no money in it” and was therefore “not interesting”
to most “bread-and-butter” students.222 Precisely for this reason, Wechsler saw
214. Frankfurter, supra note 125, at 539.
215. Reminiscences, supra note 162, at 50.
216. Id. at 50-51.
217. Id. at 50. Not simply a financial crisis, the Depression also bore a radicalizing effect, pushing
teachers and students to think more about “social problems” than they might otherwise have
in more robust times. Id. at 59.
218. Id. at 59.
219. Id. at 50-51.
220. Id. at 51.
221. Id. at 50.
222. Id. at 98.
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teaching the course as an “opportunity” for him to put his philosophical and
political assumptions into practice.223
Yet Wechsler did not stray completely from the case method. He and
Michael chose an arguably conservative, perhaps even subversive path to
reform by assembling “pedagogical materials” that included traditional
cases but also “invited cogitation outside the closed system.”224 Rather than
debunk the casebook entirely, they modified it to introduce students both
to case reading and to “legislative or quasi-legislative judgment,” in part by
incorporating a variety of materials that pressed students to ponder such
“interesting questions” as: “What are the consequences of this or the other
type of formulation or norm?”225 “How can we find out something about
consequences?”226 And “How can we face up candidly to value choices?”227
Such questions, believed Wechsler, constituted a “wholly different way of
thinking about the law” than the earlier “Langdellian way.”228
Other members of the Columbia faculty also leaned toward incorporating
new methodologies into their case method classes. In his landmark 1930
casebook on Sales, for example, Karl Llewellyn declared openly that “an
effort” had been made “to draw on suggestions from the other social sciences,”
including “modern psychology,” “sociology,” and “anthropology.”229 Columbia
Law Professor Walter Gellhorn joined Llewellyn, including new materials and
mounting new courses in public and administrative law, eventually publishing
an influential casebook on administrative law in 1940.230 Meanwhile, Herbert
Wechsler and Jerome Michael completed the final touches on their criminal
law casebook, publishing it in 1940.
By the close of the 1930s, Columbia Law School had undergone a quiet
transformation, directed by law professors committed to realigning legal
pedagogy with New Deal politics, meanwhile preparing law students for
new careers. During this time, Karl Llewellyn’s enthusiasm for the “bramble
bush” of the case method diminished, pushing him to become increasingly
223. Id. at 98.
224. Id. at 105. Wechsler’s decision to reform legal pedagogy by subtly undermining the case
method might be criticized for not going far enough, for “allowing,” as Bruce Ackerman
puts it, “the profession to survive the New Deal without reconstructing its basic conceptual
equipment.” Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 5 (1984). However,
Wechsler may also have been afraid that too blunt a revolt might have precipitated a crisis
similar to the one that precipitated Herman Oliphant’s departure from Columbia Law
School to the Political Science Department at Johns Hopkins. See supra text accompanying
note 130.
225. Reminiscences, supra note 162, at 100.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 100-01.
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critical of legal education as the 1930s progressed. Others joined, including
Llewellyn’s colleagues Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, all assembling
new casebooks with fewer cases and more secondary materials, essentially
merging the study of cases with the study of secondary sources during the first
three years.
This was important. Even as schools in the 1920s veered toward an
incorporation of interdisciplinary materials, they did so primarily in
advanced third and fourth years, frequently with the understanding that
interdisciplinary work was best reserved for advanced students interested
in pursuing optional master’s or doctorate degrees. Beginning in the 1930s,
however, scholars at leading schools such as Columbia began to incorporate
secondary materials earlier. To illustrate, one need only compare a section of
Wechsler and Michael’s casebook on voluntary manslaughter with that of
Joseph Henry Beale.231 In his 1893 text, Beale covered the specific offense of
voluntary manslaughter by assigning eight cases, no comments or notes.232 By
contrast, Wechsler assigned only one case.233 The case, Regina v. Welsh, was one
that Beale had included in his casebook, but Wechsler and Michael omitted
its companions, providing students with little sense of how cases could be
synthesized or “matched” to derive legal rules.234 Instead, Wechsler filled the
section with notes, including brief summaries of several cases along with North
Dakota’s statutory prohibition against infanticide, an excerpt from Bentham’s
“Theory of Legislation,” an excerpt from Holmes’ “The Common Law,” and
a statute from India.235
For a new generation of law teachers, Wechsler’s method provided an
exciting new take on the old case method. According to Sanford Kadish, a
World War II veteran who took Wechsler’s class and went on to draft one
of the most widely used criminal law casebooks in the country, Wechsler’s
approach was “intellectually exciting in a way that other classes were not.”236
231. Joseph Henry Beale, A Selection of Cases and Other Authorities upon Criminal Law
(1894).
232. The first case, Lord Morly’s Case (1666), drawn from England, held that words alone could not
constitute provocation, but if words led to combat “betwixt two upon a sudden heat,” then
any ensuing death could be charged as manslaughter. In the next case, Huggett’s Case (1666)
a defendant was impressed into the “Majesty’s service” without a valid warrant, leading
several men to come to his rescue, killing a police officer in the process. Reluctant to offer
“encouragement to private men to take upon themselves to be the assertors of other men’s
liberties,” the court held that the killing was murder, not manslaughter. In the remaining six
cases, all drawn from English courts, students were required to actively consider different
applications of the principle of provocation, all arising from slightly different factual
scenarios, including throwing a pickpocket into an “adjoining pond,” stabbing a woman
in the back after she delivered a “box on the ear,” and killing a constable in response to an
“illegal” arrest. Id. at 473-77.
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While other courses stressed “legal distinctions and legal analysis”, Wechsler
mounted a class that was at once “highly analytical and self-consciously
intellectual,” pushing students to consider problems from a “legislative point
of view.”237
Kadish left Wechsler’s class transformed, eventually publishing his own,
Wechsler-inspired casebook in 1960.238 The book enjoyed lasting success,
going through subsequent printings into the 21st century.239 Meanwhile, Karl
Llewellyn softened his attack on legal education, returning in the 1950s to calls
for “legal scholarship” that “lay almost wholly outside the orbit of doctrine.”240
“[O]nce war and the teaching jam were over,” declared Llewellyn, “we had
acquired a profession with heavy injections of new ideas, new personnel, new
backgrounds of experience,” and new “hungers for facts about the life of the
law, for knowledge about and understanding of conditions in this sport or area
or in that or somewhere else; even—and this is the most gratifying—hungers
for knowledge and understanding of basic processes in legal institutions.”241 If
the Depression sparked anger at legal education’s failure to prepare practiceready lawyers, in other words, the economic boom that followed World War
II coincided with renewed interest in theoretical work. “I should guess,”
asserted Llewellyn in 1956, “that 1951-1960 offers prospect of three times as
much significant research about matters legal, in areas other than doctrine, as
got done in the whole preceding fifty years.”242
One year later, as Llewellyn settled into a new position at the University of
Chicago Law School, he continued to exhibit enthusiasm for research, even
criticizing law teachers who aimed to eliminate “that whole perspective and
background of philosophy and of national and international governmental
practice.”243 “[T]he arts of law,” continued Llewellyn, “are not only essential
to any professional work, they are also law’s common ground with those
humanities which are a university’s core and pride, and among which law
should stand with the proudest.”244 Llewellyn’s reference to the humanities
flagged a resurgent post-Depression interest in keeping a place for law schools
at the university’s “core,” a place otherwise dominated by departments
focused heavily on academics and research. To demonstrate how Chicago
Law School warranted a seat at the university’s table, Llewellyn extolled its
diversity of course offerings, including “a most interesting comparative law
Berkeley Law School, in Berkeley, Cal. (May 19, 2008)(on file with author).
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development” involving “a full year’s intensive work in a foreign legal system
and its language … followed by a year’s locally-supervised study and practice
in the relevant foreign country,” what Llewellyn described as an “ingenious
device for equipping an American to do legal work across national and
language barriers.”245 Llewellyn also celebrated Chicago’s course offerings in
jurisprudence, particularly its “Jurisprudence Law in Our Society,” a course
that involved “weekly papers” focused on “philosophies of government.”246
Yet, even as Llewellyn extolled scholarship, so too did he lament the
textbook innovations of his former Columbia colleague Herbert Wechsler.247
“[N]ot too many students are fully aware,” argued Llewellyn, “of the ways in
which today’s case-books have tended to defeat the finest values open to the
case-method,” a not-so-subtle allusion to Wechsler’s reduction in the number
and length of cases that students were required to read.248 Alarmed at the
emerging popularity of Wechsler’s approach, Llewellyn urged caution. Not
only did new casebooks tend to overedit cases, he argued, but their reduction
in the total number of cases caused pedagogical problems, as well. “[T]he case
loses its very discussion value,” argued the recently hired Chicago professor, “if
it is presented alone and simply to illustrate or communicate its rule, instead
of appearing with companion cases to show development or to challenge to
thoughtful distinction and synthesis and in either aspect to clothe the general
situation in question with detail and flavor enough to turn student’s policyjudgment into more than a guess or a daydream.”249 Luckily, Chicago “edited”
cases “in the finest original tradition,” much as he did in his book on Sales,
providing a much-needed counterpoint to the emerging trend.250
Though careful not to implicate his new school, Llewellyn’s critique of
“today’s casebooks” revealed the extent to which Langdell’s method had
begun to evolve as authors such as Wechsler added new, secondary materials
to provide interdisciplinary perspectives. However, the emergence of such
perspectives in the first three years of law school had an unanticipated effect.
By introducing more theoretical materials to required courses, it diluted the
notion that theoretical work should be reserved for optional, post-graduate
degrees. Just as legal education became more interdisciplinary, in other words,
so too did legal reformers begin to call for awarding all graduates of threeyear law schools a doctorate, whether they completed independent research
projects or not.
This became particularly obvious in the 1950s and 60s’, as smaller, regional
schools clamored for greater prestige. By 1964, for example, twenty-seven
245. Id. at 17.
246. Id. at 18.
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248. Llewellyn, supra note 243, at 18.
249. Id.
250. Id.

Bramble Bush Revisited

175

schools had abandoned the Bachelor of Laws, or LL.B., for the J.D.; almost
all regional institutions that enjoyed little national prominence.251 One of the
foremost proponents of such a move, Oklahoma City School of Law Dean
John G. Hervey, possessed little interest in scholarship or research, drawing
a clear line between “professional doctorates” such as the M.D. and D.D.S.
(dentistry); and “research doctorates,” like the Ph.D.252 Though prominent
law schools such as Columbia, Harvard and Yale reserved the doctorate
for advanced candidates conducting original research, Hervey viewed such
accolades in shallower terms; arguing that awarding J.D.s would eliminate
confusion between the LL.B. and the Bachelors of Arts and Science, meanwhile
“enhanc[ing] the professional stature,” of law school graduates.253
Of course, Hervey failed to mention that just as some confused the LL.B.
and the B.A., so too did others confuse the J.D. and the Ph.D. No less than
the National Education Association made such a mistake, conducting a study
in 1960 equating the LL.B. degree with a “low level of preparation” in law on
par with a B.A., meanwhile counting J.D.s “as doctor’s degrees,” on par with
the Ph.D.254 Though careful to note that the J.D. remained a “professional
doctorate,” even Hervey maintained that the “level of intellectual activity”
required for the J.D. placed it firmly within the range of a doctorate and not a
bachelor’s or master’s degree.255 Time spent in school was a factor. “A change
of the education symbol to J.D.,” he argued, “is thus required to insure fairness
to law school graduates who pursue three or more years of post-bachelor
study.”256
By the time Hervey put pen to paper, a number of law schools had already
moved to the Juris Doctor—reasoning that since they no longer accepted
students straight out of high school, a second bachelor’s degree was redundant.
While Hervey conceded that some required students to complete independent
research projects before granting them a doctorate, most did not. “During
the academic year 1963-64,” he noted, “the J.D. degree was conferred by 27
schools,” only some of whom reserved it for “those who had attained a specific
251. They were the Drake University, State University of New York at Buffalo, St. Mary’s
University, University of South Dakota, American University, Willamette University,
University of San Diego, California-Western University, South Texas College of Law, Ohio
Northern University, Western Reserve University, Chase College, Franklin University,
University of Toledo, Emory University, University of Oklahoma, University of Missouri,
University of Tulsa, Washburn University of Topeka, Creighton University, Washington
University (St. Louis), University of Akron, Saint Louis University, University of Missouri
at Kansas City, University of Cincinnati, Cleveland-Marshall Law School of BaldwinWallace College and the University of Kansas. Hervey, supra note 22, at 5.
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grade average or who had successfully completed a research project.”257 Rather
than promote heightened research requirements, essentially nudging the J.D.
in the direction of the Ph.D., Hervey called for cosmetic reform, arguing that
a simple name-change would enhance the stature of law schools within larger
university systems. “The receipt of a second bachelor’s degree by law school
graduates,” he maintained, “tends to impair the image of the legal profession,”
meanwhile lowering “the image of the law school in the minds of those who
instruct in the other divisions of the parent institution.”258
Not everyone agreed. According to George P. Smith, an instructor at
the University of Michigan, law schools should strive to improve their core
curricula if they wanted to command the respect of the larger academic
community, not simply rename their degrees. “Although the ‘image’ of the
general profession as well as the law schools need to be strengthened,” conceded
Smith, “the uniform awarding of the J.D. degree is not, at this particular time,
the proper remedy to pursue. Rather, the development and improvement of
the standards for the work done for the basic law degree should be of first
and primary consideration.”259 Smith did not elaborate on how, precisely, the
mandatory curriculum should be improved. However, he did seem to indicate
that advanced level research remained better suited for advanced law degrees,
either the Master of Laws (LL.M.) or the Doctor of Jurisprudence (S.J.D.).260
Schools that awarded the S.J.D. and LL.M. tended not to support the
J.D. movement for at least two reasons. One, the conferral of a doctorate on
all students who had completed three years of law school undermined the
prestige of advanced degrees. After all, why pursue an additional doctorate,
much less a master’s, if one already held a doctorate in hand? Two, the move
to a uniform J.D. originated with inferior, evening law schools that did not
support advanced research to begin with, a fact that further rankled the
“big” East Coast schools.261 At least this was the fear of the three schools that
offered “the largest graduate programs” in the country, “Harvard, Yale, and
Columbia,” none of whom were “anxious to award a ‘doctor’s degree’ before
the LL.M. and S.J.D.”.262
Ivy League reluctance underscored Smith’s complaint that the “J.D.
Movement” was “spearheaded” by inferior schools, institutions that were
not “members of the [AALS] and are evening schools.”263 “Dean Hervey lists
27 schools,” continued Smith, “[e]ight of the twenty-seven schools are not
members of the Association of American Law Schools. Of the four additional
257. Id.
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schools proposing (considering) the adoption, two are not members of the
Association. Thirteen out of the twenty-seven schools comprising the Hervey
List are night schools, with five being solely evening schools and the other
eight having both day and evening classes.”264 In a private letter to Smith,
Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold agreed with him, describing
the “J.D. Movement” as “unwise, unsound, and undesirable.”265
Sadly for Smith, elite law schools found themselves outnumbered. Both
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the Association for American
Law Schools (AALS) recommended in 1964 that law schools move to the
Juris Doctorate for three years of work.266 One reason for this was to place
“the graduates of law schools upon an equality” with those “who receive
professional doctorates.”267 Another was to eliminate public confusion between
the Bachelors of Arts and Sciences and graduate legal work. To “the general
public,” noted Hervey, a “bachelor’s is a bachelor’s is a bachelor’s.”268
VI. Conclusion: A Doctorate for All
By the close of the 1960s, the Juris Doctor reigned ascendant over other law
degrees, Columbia and Harvard both adopting it in 1969 and Yale—the final
holdout—in 1971.269 Thus ended a half-century of debate over the appropriate
law school credential, even as the role of theoretical work, interdisciplinary
material and pure research in the first three years remained unsettled. As we
have seen, early progressive-era proponents of raising the academic profile
of legal education lobbied for optional fourth and fifth years dedicated to
academics and research resulting in a master’s and then doctoral degree.270 Such
a system provided a clear, logical delineation between minimum standards
required for entrance to the bar and more advanced work for those interested
in specialization or pure academics.271 The tier structure made further sense
given that law students graduated with a second bachelor’s, or LL.B., upon
completing the first three years, a holdout from the days when students could
matriculate without first earning a Bachelor of Arts or Science.272
Karl Llewellyn’s iconic Bramble Bush lectures extolled the practical value of
the LL.B. system as late as 1929, even as schools across the country tacked
264. Id. at 10.
265. Dean Erwin N. Griswold to George P. Smith, II, Sept. 20, 1965, cited in George P. Smith, II,
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an extra year onto their bachelor’s curriculum.273 Though many students
lamented the addition of a third year, Llewellyn embraced it, celebrating
deeper immersion into legal topics, more interdisciplinary offerings, and a
heightened profile for legal education generally.274
Enter the Great Depression.275 As this Article has sought to demonstrate,
the economic downturn of the 1930s dramatically influenced views of legal
education, a point illustrated starkly by Karl Llewellyn himself.276 While
enthusiastic about legal education in 1929, Llewellyn soured as the Depression
dragged on. By 1935, he complained that law schools were mere “assembly
lines” dedicated to taking their students’ “coin” and providing them little of
practical value in return.277 Llewellyn furthered this critique in 1936, joining a
score of academics calling for pedagogic reform.278
However, Llewellyn did not target interdisciplinary scholarship. While
some reformers called for an increased attention to clinical work and practical
skills, Llewellyn joined a cadre of pro-New Deal law teachers who advocated
interdisciplinary, policy-centered coursework.279 For example, Llewellyn’s
colleague Herbert Wechsler argued that private-sector slowdowns could
be compensated by placing students in federal New Deal agencies, a move
that required at least some familiarity with interdisciplinary policy issues.280
Further, Wechsler joined other scholars in de-emphasizing the value of the
case method, arguing that it contributed to overconfidence in the private
sector and did not warrant its dominant position in legal pedagogy.281 To
weaken the method’s hold, Wechsler joined his senior colleague Jerome
Michael in pioneering a new style of casebook featuring fewer opinions and
more secondary, interdisciplinary materials.282
As the Depression gave way to postwar prosperity, Wechsler’s method caught
on.283 Even diehard proponents of the case method such as Karl Llewellyn—
who lamented the drop in assigned cases in books such as Wechsler’s—extolled
the availability of interdisciplinary offerings in fields such as comparative law
and jurisprudence.284 That such offerings came in the first three years did not
273. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 11-15.
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seem to bother anyone, even though they had once been reserved for optional
fourth- and fifth-year work.285
That interdisciplinary work had once been tied to fourth- and fifth-year
classes remains one of the most overlooked aspects of law school history today.
Current critics of legal education lament the fact that overly academic courses
clutter the J.D. curriculum, forgetting that the simple pursuit of practical
training underwent its own dark period prior to the Depression as law schools
strove to increase their standing among other university departments.286 Early
reformers solved this challenge by trifurcating law degrees, leaving the LL.B.
for practice-minded students and the more advanced master’s and doctorate
degrees for students who wanted specialized, even abstract knowledge.287
However, less prestigious schools clamored for the right to confer a higher
credential in the 1950s and 60s’, disrupting the progressive-era equilibrium.288
Just as the distinction between mandatory and optional work faded, so
too did the J.D. movement confuse the role that pure research played in
the legal academy.289 Yet proponents of the J.D. movement justified their
position, in part, by citing the increasingly theoretical nature of the threeyear curriculum.290 Herein lies an irony that current law school critics fail to
appreciate: Even as top law schools attacked the J.D. movement for watering
down legal credentials, few proponents of that movement complained about
theoretical work in the first three years, conceding that precisely such work
warranted a Juris Doctor degree.291
While we may wonder whether the incorporation of theoretical work into
a three-year curriculum is practically necessary, the rise of the Juris Doctor
would arguably never have occurred had law schools simply aimed to train
practitioners. As we have seen, its history is closely tied to efforts by legal
reformers to make law school the equivalent of comparable graduate programs,
a struggle arguably dating back to the days of Langdell.292 Even John Hervey,
champion of the “professional” doctorate, extolled the academic nature of the
three-year program, a program that did indeed become much more theoretical
during the New Deal.293
This leads to a final point. While current arguments that law school is
too long may warrant merit, the conferral of a Juris Doctor for two years
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of practical/clinical training may not.294 Already, the legal doctorate lacks
academic credibility of the Ph.D. Further diluting its significance may only
jeopardize the standing of law schools vis-à-vis other university departments,
perhaps weakening their institutional status and claims to resources. Better to
keep law schools firmly wedded to the research mission of universities generally,
meanwhile providing more options for students interested in practical skills,
maybe by revisiting the question of plural degrees. As we have seen, there is
precedent for such a move (a Master of Laws after two years’ work with an
option to then take the bar exam, a Juris Doctor for three, and an S.J.D. for
more). It also enjoys a certain logic, perhaps one more compelling than the
postwar argument that all lawyers deserve the J.D. simply because it enhances
their prestige.295

294. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Town Hall at Binghamton University,
Aug. 23, 2013, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/23/
remarks-president-town-hall-binghamton-university.
295. Spencer, supra note 11, at 1984. Shaving one year off the current curriculum will leave little
room for inter-disciplinary, policy-oriented courses, and may even change the way doctrinal
courses are taught. For example, two years reduces the time available to take bar classes, a
move that they may push casebook authors and teachers to truncate their syllabi, and adopt
more condensed teaching methods. Precisely such methods dominated American law schools
during the early Progressive Era, as law schools crammed multiple topics into a single year
through BarBri style lecture. While a return to lecture may be agreeable to some, important
questions remain as to whether graduates of such truncated programs should receive a Juris
Doctor degree. For free-standing law schools with no university ties, the answer may be yes.
For law schools affiliated with larger, research universities, however, the abbreviation of legal
education may warrant some consideration of the continued legitimacy of legal education in
the eyes of universities generally, a dilemma that might warrant reconsideration of the plural
degree.

